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741 
Note 
 
Blight and Its Discontents: Awarding Attorney’s 
Fees to Property Owners in Redevelopment 
Actions 
Noreen E. Johnson∗ 
In June 2007, National City, California renewed a designa-
tion declaring two-thirds of the city blighted.1 The city council’s 
decision to renew this comprehensive designation came as a 
blow to Carlos Barragan and his son, Carlos Jr., who had spent 
over fifteen years building a strong after-school program for at-
risk youth in their community2 and finally moved the program 
to a newly renovated gym in 2002.3 With this declaration of 
blight, the Barragans faced the imminent threat that their 
newly renovated gym would be replaced by upscale condomi-
niums.4 Despite numerous requests to the city to provide their 
findings of blight under the California Public Records Act,5 the 
city refused to release the results of the 2007 blight study until 
a few days before the hearing, making any meaningful opposi-
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 1. See Inst. for Justice, Knocking Out Eminent Domain Abuse: Youth 
Gym Files Suit Against National City, Calif., http://www.ij.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=868 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
 2. Id. For the Community Youth Athletic Center (CYAC) website describ-
ing their program and the services they provide, see CYAC Programs and 
Events, http://cyacboxing.org/events/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
 3. CYAC Boxing Timeline, http://cyacboxing.org/media/flash/ (follow the 
“2002” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
 4. See Inst. for Justice, supra note 1. 
 5. CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 6250–6276.48 (West 2008). 
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tion to the findings nearly impossible.6 To make matters worse, 
after the hearings, the Barragans had only ninety days to file 
suit before they lost their right to object.7 
The Barragans were fortunate. A public interest law firm 
took their case, representing them at the public hearings re-
lated to the official determination of blight8 and filing a civil 
suit challenging the city’s actions as contrary to state and fed-
eral law.9 As a result of their legal representation and the me-
dia backlash that came from increased public awareness,10 the 
developers indicated that they may be willing to build around 
the gym.11 More importantly, the Barragans have a chance to 
voice their objections to the blight designation in court.12 
Many property owners and business owners, however, are 
not so lucky. Given the cost and expense of mounting a legal 
challenge to a redevelopment project or condemnation action, it 
is very difficult for the average American to even consider chal-
lenging a redevelopment agency’s decision.13 The procedures in 
National City and other cities across the United States make 
the process for opposing them so complicated and onerous that 
it is almost impossible for ordinary citizens to respond and ob-
ject to these designations. The difficulties property owners face 
apply with equal force to condemnation actions, in which the 
property owner is made an involuntary defendant and is un-
likely to capably navigate the difficult legal and factual issues 
 
 6. See Inst. for Justice, supra note 1. 
 7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33501 (Supp. 2008) (effective Jan. 1, 
2007). 
 8. See Inst. for Justice, supra note 1. 
 9. For the official complaint filed on September 25, 2007, with the Cali-
fornia Superior Court, see Complaint, Com. Youth Athletic Ctr v. Nat’l City, 
No. GIS 37-2007-00076404-CU-EI-SC (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 25, 2007), 
available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/private_property/national_ 
city/NationalCityComplaint.pdf. 
 10. For an example of the media backlash against National City’s actions, 
see Rick Reilly, An Unfair Fight, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 13, 2007, at 88. 
 11. Tanya Sierra, Developer Won’t Oust Popular Gym; He’ll Build Project 
Around It, SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM, Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.signonsandiego 
.com/uniontrib/20070830/news_1m30ncgym.html. 
 12. The case is currently on appeal after being dismissed by the district 
judge on a technicality in February 2008. See Inst. for Justice, Eminent Do-
main Case Dismissed on Technicality, Gym Will Appeal (Feb. 15, 2008), http:// 
www.ij.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=869&Itemid=165. 
 13. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation 
Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 887–90 (2007) (suggesting that many individu-
als, particularly owners of low-value lots, lack the resources to mount a viable 
challenge to a redevelopment project). 
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of “public use”14 and “just compensation”15 without hiring a 
lawyer. 
Part I of this Note reviews the development of the public-
use doctrine of eminent domain, including its crystallization in 
the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don.16 It explores the development of the justifications for ur-
ban renewal from the elimination of blight to pure economic 
development, and it discusses the states’ backlash against Kelo 
which has resulted in a plethora of new laws and additional 
substantive and procedural protections for property owners. 
Finally, this Part discusses the difficulties that a property own-
er may face in challenging a finding of public use or a condem-
nation award. 
Part II suggests that, while state reform efforts have pro-
vided significant additional protections to property owners, 
they are frequently poorly implemented, thus undermining the 
efforts of the state legislatures. It analyzes several proposals 
that have been made to improve implementation of these laws 
and argues that a simple fee-shifting statute, providing that lit-
igation expenses be paid by the condemning authority in cer-
tain cases, would be the most efficient means for states to rein-
force these reforms. While some states have utilized fee shifting 
in eminent domain proceedings since the 1970s,17 very few 
scholars have examined the intersections of these two bodies of 
law, despite the increased attention to eminent domain reform 
in the wake of Kelo. This is an important gap in the scholarly 
literature because fee shifting represents a practical and effec-
tive solution to some of the problems posed by redevelopment 
and could be easily employed alongside other eminent domain 
reforms. This Note concludes with a useful model state statute, 
which would allow property owners to claim their rights under 
state law by improving their access to legal representation. 
This issue of eminent domain reform was never more rele-
vant than it is today. Over the three years since Kelo, almost 
every state has either reformed or considered reforming its 
eminent domain code18 and state courts have begun to scrutin-
 
 14. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 15. See id. 
 16. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 17. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001) (enacted 1971). 
 18. See CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT 
DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO 1–4 (2007) (providing a compre-
hensive fifty-state survey of changes to state eminent domain laws since Kelo). 
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ize these cases more carefully than in years past.19 The in-
creased attention state legislatures and courts are paying to 
this issue is likely due to the fact that people across a broad 
spectrum of political values and beliefs are concerned about the 
inappropriate use of eminent domain.20 Surveys suggest that 
eighty-one percent of the American population opposes the Kelo 
decision,21 and the overwhelming opposition to the decision 
crosses both race and political party lines.22 Thus, state legisla-
tures are now actively considering ways to reform their emi-
nent domain code to protect the rights of property owners, both 
substantively and procedurally. Yet despite the increased at-
tention to the issue of eminent domain, only a small group of 
states have enacted or amended fee-shifting statutes as part of 
their reform efforts.23 Thus, while a substantial minority of 
states have fee-shifting statutes on the books,24 many of these 
statutes have not been updated since Kelo.25 A careful look at 
these statutes, both recent and older, suggests that a number of 
them could be significantly improved to better address the con-
cerns raised by Kelo.26 Moreover, over half of states do not pro-
vide for fee shifting in the eminent domain context at all.27 
 
 19. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 651, 673 (2008) (“The public, legislative, and judicial reaction to 
Kelo was significant and swift. Throughout the country, the public, state legis-
latures, and state courts were quick to take up Justice Stevens’ invitation to 
narrow what constitutes a public use as a matter of state law.”). 
 20. A brief survey of the amicus briefs submitted in support of Suzette Ke-
lo reveals the wide appeal of this issue. See, e.g., Brief for the Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 
(No. 04-108); Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108); Brief for the National Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108). 
 21. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Re-
sponse to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2009). 
 22. See id. 
 23. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122 (2007); IOWA CODE § 6B.33 
(2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 213.66 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MINN. 
STAT. § 117.031 (2006). 
 24. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 890 (estimating that 
twenty states have provisions that provide for fee shifting in some cases in the 
eminent domain context). 
 25. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (2005) (last amended 1999); N.Y. EM. 
DOM. PROC. LAW §§ 701–702 (McKinney 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 
(2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-510 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06). 
 26. For example, the Pennsylvania statute provides for fee shifting only 
up to $4,000. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (West Supp. 2008). 
 27. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 890. 
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Thus, the time has never been riper to consider additional pro-
tections for property owners that would add significant teeth to 
preexisting and pending eminent domain reforms. 
I.  BLIGHT, PUBLIC USE, AND THE CHANGING FACE OF 
REDEVELOPMENT LAW   
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”28 This small clause of the 
Constitution caused a firestorm of controversy ever since the 
Supreme Court handed down its now notorious decision in Kelo 
v. City of New London.29 In Kelo, a group of homeowners 
brought suit against the city of New London, Connecticut to 
oppose the city’s decision to initiate condemnation proceedings 
to transfer their homes to Pfizer Corporation as part of a rede-
velopment plan for the renewal of the city center.30 The peti-
tioners, none of whose properties was found blighted or in poor 
condition,31 argued that the taking of their properties violated 
the public use limitation implicit in the Fifth Amendment and 
asked for injunctive relief.32 The Kelo Court rejected the peti-
tioners’ claims and held that the Public Use Clause permitted 
local governments to transfer property from one private party 
to another for the public purpose of economic development.33 
Kelo did not revolutionize redevelopment law, but rather af-
firmed a long line of precedent applying a deferential standard 
of review to economic development projects.34 However, it dis-
appointed some scholars who had hoped that the Supreme 
Court would limit the almost limitless scope of some of its ear-
lier decisions.35 Before Kelo, a minority of scholars maintained 
that public use meant “public right of access.”36 However, the 
Supreme Court in Kelo read public use as “public purpose,” al-
 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 29. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 30. Id. at 473–77. 
 31. Id. at 475. 
 32. Id. at 474–77. 
 33. Id. at 483–86. 
 34. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 35. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Devel-
opment Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 243–44 (2007) (criti-
cizing the majority’s decision and reasoning in Kelo). 
 36. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 161–69 (1985). 
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lowing any private-to-private transfers of property using emi-
nent domain for economic-development purposes.37 
This ruling was immediately attacked by public figures on 
both the left38 and right39 and has become a political flashpoint 
in the last two years. Although few scholars of property law 
were surprised by the Kelo decision,40 ordinary Americans re-
sponded viscerally to the potentially broad sweep of the deci-
sion.41 Justice O’Connor captured the fears of many in her dis-
sent: “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. 
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with 
a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm 
with a factory.”42 Trying to limit some of the potential implica-
tions of the decision, forty-two states reformed their eminent 
domain laws by 2007, many to create narrower public use in-
terpretations.43 However, despite these stricter provisions, 
many statutes contain significant loopholes that weaken the ef-
ficacy of the reform efforts.44 
A. FROM THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY TO KELO: FROM 
BLIGHT TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The theory of modern urban redevelopment grew out of the 
Chicago school of sociology during the 1920s and 1930s.45 Soci-
 
 37. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484. 
 38. For Ralph Nader’s reaction to Kelo, see Ralph Nader, Statement, June 
23, 2005, http://ml.greens.org/pipermail/ctgp-news/2005-June/000507.html 
(“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London mocks 
common sense, tarnishes constitutional law and is an affront to fundamental 
fairness.”). 
 39. For Rush Limbaugh’s reaction to Kelo, see Rush Limbaugh, Rush 
Limbaugh: Liberals Like Stephen Breyer Have Bastardized the Constitution 
(Radio Transcript Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/ 
1501453/posts (“Kelo was decided in favor of the big guy, and Kelo was de-
cided, by the way, in a way that the Constitution doesn’t say.”). 
 40. See The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Pri-
vate Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 
(2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Thomas Merrill, Professor, Colum-
bia Law School) (discussing his own lack of surprise at the Kelo decision). 
 41. See Somin, supra note 21, at 5–7. 
 42. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 43. See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 1 (providing a comprehen-
sive fifty-state survey of changes to state eminent domain laws since Kelo). 
 44. See Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” so Far: Will Americans Get 
Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709, 727; So-
min, supra note 21, at 11. 
 45. Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal 
and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 16 
(2003). 
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ologists, such as Ernest Burgess and Roderick D. McKenzie, 
studied the lives of the poor in urban centers and developed an 
“ecological approach” to the development of cities.46 Following 
this approach, urban planners and real estate developers 
worked together to reconstruct American cities by advocating 
for greater urban planning and the elimination of slums and 
blight.47 Slums were generally understood to be dangers to pub-
lic health and safety, while blighted areas were in the process 
of evolving into slums.48 Blight was a word that originally re-
ferred to plant disease but was incorporated into the rhetoric of 
urban planners to suggest the organic nature of city develop-
ment and decline.49 The only way to prevent this steady decline 
was centralized city planning.50 
From the beginning, the theory was plagued by the prob-
lem of creating a precise definition of blight.51 For example, the 
Committee of Blighted Areas and Slums, a creation of Herbert 
Hoover’s tenure as Secretary of Commerce, stated that “a 
blighted area is an area where, due either to the lack of a vita-
lizing factor or to the presence of a devitalizing factor, the life of 
the area has been sapped.”52 Since this theory was based on 
terms that were never well-defined, its effects were difficult to 
contain and it could be used as a justification for projects 
tainted by other motivations.53 For instance, from the begin-
ning the federal urban-renewal program had racial overtones54 
and often had the effect of forcing new immigrants and minori-
ties out of their neighborhoods.55 
 
 46. Id. For an example of this “organic” approach to urban sociology, see 
R. D. McKenzie, The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Commu-
nity, in THE CITY 63 (1925). 
 47. Pritchett, supra note 45, at 15–16. 
 48. Id. at 18. This distinction between “slum” and “blight” is rarely ob-
served in the literature surrounding urban planning today. 
 49. Id. at 16. 
 50. Id. at 17. 
 51. The problem of defining “blight” precisely continues today. See Somin, 
supra note 35, at 265–68. 
 52. Pritchett, supra note 45, at 15–18. 
 53. For a classic critique of the federal urban renewal movement, see 
MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UR-
BAN RENEWAL 1949–1962, at 219–23 (1964). 
 54. For example, Homer Hoyt argued that “certain racial and national 
groups . . . cause a greater physical deterioration of property than groups 
higher in the social and economic scale.” Pritchett, supra note 45, at 17; see 
also ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 7–8. 
 55. Pritchett, supra note 45, at 17–20. For example, blight laws frequently 
targeted those who owned small apartment buildings or tenements. The own-
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This new program of urban redevelopment was not without 
its critics and many argued that forced redevelopment was un-
constitutional.56 However, with the change in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence during the New Deal, the federal courts became 
more deferential to state and agency judgments in economic 
matters and were increasingly willing to acquiesce to whatever 
projects the state agencies deemed necessary.57 
This approach to urban planning was crystallized in the 
Supreme Court’s 1954 decision, Berman v. Parker.58 In Ber-
man, the Supreme Court upheld the District of Columbia Rede-
velopment Land Agency’s ambitious redevelopment project for 
Southwest D.C on the grounds that the use of eminent domain 
to remove blight was a public use within the context of the 
Fifth Amendment.59 In this case, the challenger owned a de-
partment store in a poor African American neighborhood in 
Washington, D.C.60 At the district court level, the court upheld 
the constitutionality of the Redevelopment Act but interpreted 
it narrowly, finding that it applied only to slum clearance and 
 
ers of these buildings were frequently immigrant Jews and Italians who had 
very little money or education and were unwilling to sell their only properties 
for the prices developers were offering. Id. at 20. For a fascinating visual de-
piction of the Chicago sociologists’ view of urban areas, see Ernest W. Burgess, 
The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project, in THE CITY 55 
(1925). 
 56. For example, the Sixth Circuit declared it unconstitutional for the 
Public Works Administration to condemn land for a housing program. United 
States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, 78 F.2d 684, 687–88 (6th Cir. 
1935) (“The taking of one citizen’s property for the purpose of improving it and 
selling or leasing it to another, or for the purpose of reducing unemployment, 
is not, in our opinion, within the scope of the powers of the federal govern-
ment.”). Although this decision deals with the limits on federal projects rather 
than state projects, it still illustrates the skepticism with which some courts 
viewed the federal government’s redevelopment projects during the early New 
Deal era. 
 57. Pritchett, supra note 45, at 40–41. 
 58. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 59. Id. at 30, 33–34. 
 60. A survey of the area showed that “64.3% of the dwellings were beyond 
repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory . . . .” Id. at 
30. It also showed that 97.5% were inhabited by African Americans. Id. In a 
pointed critique of the racial implications of this redevelopment plan, Profes-
sor Wendell Pritchett pointed out that 
Berman was argued just four months after the Supreme Court’s mo-
numental declaration on American race relations in Brown v. Board 
of Education . . . . But the two cases were intimately related. The ur-
ban renewal program that the Court approved allowed cities to redi-
stribute their populations, increasing residential segregation and the-
reby making the integration of schools far more difficult. 
Pritchett, supra note 45, at 44. 
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could not be used to clear blighted or deteriorating properties, 
as the Government argued.61 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s finding of constitutionality but on much broader 
grounds. Justice Douglas wrote: 
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as mone-
tary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as 
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.62 
Although it was clear that there were genuine slums in the 
area set for redevelopment,63 by showing so much deference to 
the agency’s decisions and embracing so broad a definition of 
the statute,64 the Supreme Court set the stage for more expan-
sive uses of blight in the future. In addition, by adopting such a 
deferential standard of review, the Court left few judicial pro-
tections in place for homeowners and business owners to chal-
lenge overbroad blight designations.65 
The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo was in many 
ways a natural outgrowth of the urban-renewal movement of 
the 1920s and 1930s and of the decision in Berman. Yet, while 
 
 61. Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724–25 (D.D.C. 
1953) (“We hold that Congress did not in the Redevelopment Act confer power 
to seize property beyond the reasonable necessities of slum clearance and pre-
vention, the word ‘slum’ meaning conditions injurious to the public health, 
safety, morals and welfare.”). 
 62. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (internal citation omitted). The district court 
took quite a different approach. Cf. Schneider, 117 F. Supp. at 719 (“The slow, 
the old, the small in ambition, the devotee of the outmoded have no less right 
to property than have the quick, the young, the aggressive, and the modernis-
tic or futuristic.”). 
 63. For instance, the neighborhood had more than twice the average 
number of deaths from tuberculosis in the District and more than four times 
the average number of deaths from syphilis. Schneider, 117 F. Supp. at 709. 
 64. The statute itself was hardly a model of clarity. There was no defini-
tion of “slums” or “blighted areas.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 n.*. The closest the 
Act came to defining these terms was in Section 3(r), which states: 
“Substandard housing conditions” means the conditions obtaining in 
connection with the existence of any dwelling, or dwellings, or hous-
ing accommodations for human beings, which because of lack of sani-
tary facilities, ventilation, or light, or because of dilapidation, over-
crowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any combination of these 
factors, is in the opinion of the Commissioners detrimental to the 
safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of the District of 
Columbia. 
Id. 
 65. While Berman did not explicitly set forth a particular standard of re-
view, the Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff interpreted the deci-
sion as simply requiring judicial deference to state legislatures’ determina-
tions when reviewing redevelopment projects. 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984). 
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Berman dealt with an impoverished neighborhood that had 
been designated blighted by a legislative determination,66 Kelo 
dealt with properties that even the redevelopers did not argue 
were blighted.67 By holding that the Public Use Clause permits 
the transfer of property from one private party to another for 
the purpose of economic development alone,68 the Court em-
braced the broad dicta of Justice Douglas’s opinion in Berman. 
Furthermore, the Court clearly removed a finding of blight as a 
precondition to the use of eminent domain in economic redeve-
lopment.69 
B. THE STATE REACTION TO KELO: BACK TO BLIGHT 
In the wake of Kelo, many commentators despaired that 
economic development was so broad a justification for redeve-
lopment that there could be no meaningful judicial review of 
condemnation actions on the grounds of public use.70 With the 
public use effectively read out of the Constitution, citizens had 
no means to challenge takings of their property except to de-
mand just compensation.71 However, while much of the broad 
language in Kelo suggests such an outcome, this result was 
checked by unprecedented grounds, well in opposition that led 
forty-two states to pass stricter laws, limiting the use of emi-
nent domain in at least some circumstances.72 
In many ways, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion in Kelo ac-
tually set the groundwork for this wave of state responses to 
the ruling. Stevens stressed the possibility of stricter state 
standards for redevelopment. He explained that “nothing in 
[the] opinion precludes any State from placing further restric-
 
 66. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28. 
 67. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (“Those who go-
vern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight . . . .”). 
 68. Id. at 483–84. 
 69. Justice O’Connor’s dissent distinguishes Berman from Kelo by empha-
sizing the blight and poverty afflicting the neighborhood in Berman. See id. at 
498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 503–04 (raising slippery slope arguments against an expansive 
definition of public use). 
 71. Even before Kelo, many scholars of American property law had sug-
gested that the Public Use Clause had been all but read out of the Constitu-
tion. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
190 n.5 (1977) (“[T]he modern understanding of ‘public use’ holds that any 
state purpose otherwise constitutional should qualify as sufficiently ‘public’ to 
justify a taking . . . .”). Viewed this way, Kelo is merely the crystallization of a 
much longer line of cases. 
 72. See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 1. 
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tions on its exercise of the takings power” and emphasized that 
“many States already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are 
stricter than the federal baseline,” either through the require-
ments of their state constitutions or their more restrictive emi-
nent domain statutes.73 Thus, even as Justice Stevens’ opinion 
reaffirmed the Berman view of public use and urban renewal as 
a matter of constitutional law, it also highlighted the possibility 
of change on the state level. 
1. The Kelo Backlash in the State Legislatures 
The response of state legislatures to Justice Stevens’ sug-
gestion has been overwhelming, yet varied from state to state. 
For example, South Dakota passed legislation in 2006 to prohi-
bit all private-to-private transfers of private property, regard-
less of blight;74 that same year, Minnesota tightened the defini-
tion of blight75 and largely limited private redevelopment to 
those properties deemed actually blighted.76 Other states, such 
as Mississippi and Massachusetts, have not passed any redeve-
lopment reforms at all.77 
While many states made meaningful and important re-
forms in the area of eminent domain law, there remain many 
significant loopholes that limit the efficacy of such laws.78 One 
of the most substantial is the states’ treatment of blight.79 Al-
though a few states banned all takings for purely economic de-
velopment,80 many left their blight laws unchanged and con-
tinued to allow economic development takings in cases of 
 
 73. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (majority opinion). 
 74. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1 (Supp. 2008). 
 75. MINN. STAT. § 117.025 (2006) (defining a “blighted area” as an area in 
“urban use . . . where more than fifty percent of the buildings are structurally 
substandard”). 
 76. Id. § 117.027. 
 77. See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 25, 28. 
 78. See Somin, supra note 35, at 261. 
 79. See id. at 266 (“In the years since those early cases, many states have 
expanded the concept of blight to encompass almost any area where economic 
development could potentially be increased.”); Will Lovell, Note, The Kelo 
Blowback: How the Newly-Enacted Eminent Domain Statutes and Past Blight 
Statutes Are a Maginot Line-Defense Mechanism for All Non-Affluent and Mi-
nority Property Owners, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 611–12 (2007) (discussing loo-
pholes with regards to blight designations in the wake of state legislative 
reform). 
 80. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 12-a; ALA. CODE § 11-80-1 (Supp. 
2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801 (2007). 
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blight.81 This failure to define blight precisely means that these 
laws are frequently so broad and vague that definitions may be 
applied to middle class neighborhoods as well as true slums.82 
In states that eliminated economic development as a public use 
while retaining broad eminent domain powers for blight re-
moval, this may undermine the reforms that state legislatures 
passed by allowing redevelopment that serves ends more akin 
to economic development than slum removal.83 Furthermore, 
municipal governments tend to prefer middle-class communi-
ties over impoverished areas as locations for redevelopment 
projects since it is easier to attract businesses to build there.84 
Thus, the effect of an overbroad definition of blight is that these 
statutes may be manipulated to redevelop middle-class neigh-
borhoods rather than urban slums.85 Some states identified this 
problem and passed more precise blight laws,86 but many still 
have definitions that are notably vague.87 
 
 81. CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 6, 17, 21, 23, 30, 46, 47, 49. 
 82. For example, in West 41st Street Realty LLC v. New York State Urban 
Development Corp., a New York appellate court found the Times Square area 
of downtown Manhattan was blighted and upheld an urban redevelopment 
project to provide the New York Times with a new headquarters. 744 N.Y.S.2d 
121, 123–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see also Somin, supra note 35, at 264–71 
(providing a good background discussion of the problems with overbroad blight 
designations). 
 83. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic De-
velopment, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 
307 (2004) (“Clearly ‘blight’ has lost any substantive meaning as either a de-
scription of urban conditions or a target for public policy. . . . Redevelopment 
policies originally intended to address unsafe or insufficient urban housing are 
now more routinely employed to subsidize the building of suburban shopping 
malls.”). 
 84. See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right for California Re-
development Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 994 (2001). 
 85. Cf. id. (“City renewal directors quickly learned there was no realistic 
chance that private builders could be drawn to developing commercial projects 
in hopelessly blighted areas.”). 
 86. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1 (Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. § 117.025 
(2006); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 205 (West Supp. 2008). 
 87. For instance, Colorado defines “blighted area” as follows: 
“Blighted area” means an area that, in its present condition and use 
and, by reason of the presence of at least four of the following factors, 
substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, 
retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an 
economic or social liability, and is a menace to the public health, safe-
ty, morals, or welfare. 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-103(2) (2007). Texas defines “blighted area” in a sim-
ilar manner: 
“Blighted area” means an area that is not a slum area, but that, be-
cause of deteriorating buildings, structures, or other improvements; 
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2. The Kelo Backlash in the State Courts 
Not only have forty-two state legislatures passed laws re-
stricting the use of eminent domain for economic development 
purposes, but state courts have also responded by interpreting 
pre-existing constitutional and statutory provisions so as to re-
strict overbroad blight designations on the state level.88 The 
proliferation of successful challenges to blight designations and 
condemnations indicates two things. First, it suggests that 
even in the wake of substantial statutory reform, a significant 
amount of eminent domain abuse continues. Second, it suggests 
that courts, when confronted with eminent domain actions that 
directly contravene state laws, are willing to intervene to strike 
the actions down. 
A brief look at some recent state supreme court decisions 
affirms this trend.89 In 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court in City of 
Norwood v. Horney reversed a lower court decision and held 
that the city’s redevelopment scheme violated both the state 
and federal constitutions.90 The court held that economic devel-
 
defective or inadequate streets, street layout, or accessibility; unsani-
tary conditions; or other hazardous conditions, adversely affects the 
public health, safety, morals, or welfare of the municipality and its 
residents, substantially retards the provision of a sound and healthful 
housing environment, or results in an economic or social liability to 
the municipality. 
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 374.003(3) (Vernon 2005). See generally Somin, 
supra note 21 (describing efforts by states to reform their eminent domain 
laws after Kelo). 
 88. This response again has its roots in Justice Stevens’s Kelo opinion. In 
his footnotes to the section discussing the possibility for narrower treatments 
of “public use” on the state level, Justice Stevens explicitly cites not only ef-
forts on the part of state legislatures to pass tougher eminent domain laws, 
but also state court decisions construing preexisting state laws and constitu-
tions more narrowly to prohibit economic development takings. See Kelo v. 
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 & nn.22–24 (2005). This suggests that 
Justice Stevens’s opinion may rest more upon stare decisis and an unwilling-
ness to undermine Berman than upon a fundamental belief that courts should 
afford legislatures absolute deference in urban planning. For example, in foot-
note 22, Justice Stevens cites County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 
(2004), in which the Supreme Court of Michigan overruled its infamous deci-
sion in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 
(1981), not on the basis of changed law, but upon a narrower reading of a 
preexisting constitutional provision. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n.22. 
 89. See, e.g., Sapero v. Mayor of Baltimore, 920 A.2d 1061, 1076–79 (Md. 
2007); Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447 
(N.J. 2007); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1142–43 (Ohio 
2006). 
 90. 853 N.E.2d at 1122–24. 
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opment alone is not a public use91 under the Ohio Constitution 
and that the “deteriorating area” standard of the statute was 
void-for-vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.92 That same year, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court held that, while the owners of a temporary ease-
ment were not entitled to notice under the Due Process Clause, 
the taking should be struck down anyway on the grounds that 
there was no public use.93 In 2007, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court struck down the city of Paulsboro’s classification of a 
property as “in need of redevelopment” by interpreting the 
“blighted areas” clause94 of the New Jersey constitution to nar-
row the scope of the redevelopment statute.95 
The federal courts also have begun looking more sympa-
thetically at challenges to redevelopment projects. For example, 
in 2005, only a few months after the Kelo decision, the Second 
Circuit held that the actions of a condemning agency violated 
procedural due process when the agency failed to give the prop-
erty owners a meaningful opportunity to be heard in challeng-
ing the purpose of the condemnation.96 The court ruled that, by 
failing to provide the owner notice of the thirty-day period 
which provided the only window for challenging the finding of 
public use, the city effectively made it impossible for property 
owners to realize their rights.97 The continued inability of prop-
erty owners to claim their rights poses a significant problem in 
the context of urban redevelopment and condemnation proceed-
ings and continues to pose an implementation problem for leg-
islatures and agencies.98 
 
 91. Id. at 1140–41. 
 92. Id. at 1142–46. 
 93. R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 99, 104 (R.I. 2006). 
 94. N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 3. 
 95. Gallenthin Realty Dev. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 460–62 
(N.J. 2007). 
 96. Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 127–32 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 97. Id. at 132 (“Thus, we now hold that ‘reasonable notice’ under these 
circumstances must include mention of the commencement of the thirty-day 
challenge period. . . . It is not likely that the average landowner would have 
appreciated that notice of the Determination and Findings began the exclusive 
period in which to initiate a challenge to the condemnor’s determination.”). 
 98. For just one example for how this problem of inadequate procedures 
and insensitive authorities has ensconced itself in the public imagination, see 
DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 5–36 (1979). With-
in the first few pages of the novel, Earth is destroyed to make room for a 
“hyperspatial express route” with no notice or ceremony to its inhabitants. Id. 
at 35. The Vogons who are taking the planet for their route justify themselves 
in a classic parody of an unsympathetic planning board’s public statement: 
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Thus, despite the explosion of interest among state legisla-
tures to reform state eminent domain codes and the increase of 
state supreme courts striking down illegal redevelopment ac-
tions, a lingering problem remains. While the definitions of 
blight have been tightened and economic development takings 
have been banned in some cases, these reforms are only mea-
ningful if they are carefully implemented. Thus envisioned, the 
problem then is one of fostering the proper implementation of 
protections that are already in place. Given that those who are 
most likely to be affected by overbroad blight designations are 
those who will be least prepared to challenge them, it is impor-
tant to create a system in which claims against redevelopment 
projects that directly contradict the spirit of the new state laws 
are incentivized rather than discouraged. 
C. THE MECHANICS OF REDEVELOPMENT 
To appreciate some of the difficulties in challenging public 
use and blight, it is helpful to examine the statutory basis for 
these determinations. Although the exact statutory procedures 
vary from state to state, an overview of the content of these 
laws provides the general legal framework for most modern re-
development projects. 
1. Formation of a Redevelopment Area and Implementation of 
Tax Increment Financing 
The process of redevelopment generally begins with the 
enactment of a tax increment financing (TIF) district and the 
formation of a redevelopment commission or agency.99 This re-
development commission is responsible for creating a redeve-
lopment district and preparing a detailed redevelopment 
plan.100 In this plan, the redevelopment agency makes findings 
 
There’s no point acting all surprised about it. All the planning charts 
and demolition orders have been on display in your local planning de-
partment in Alpha Centauri for fifty of your Earth years, so you’ve had 
plenty of time to lodge any formal complaint and it’s far too late to 
start making a fuss about it now. 
Id. at 35–36. 
 99. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.174–.175 (West Interim Ann. Serv. 
June 2008); see also Julie A. Goshorn, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax In-
crement Financing Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 926–28 (1999) (explaining 
the mechanics of a TIF project); Catherine Michel, Brother, Can You Spare a 
Dime: Tax Increment Financing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457, 459 (1996) (ex-
plaining the structure of TIF and its use in Indiana). 
 100. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175; see also Goshorn, supra note 99, 
at 926; J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financ-
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showing that the area meets certain criteria.101 Some states re-
quire a finding that the private investment would not reasona-
bly be expected to occur without government intervention.102 
Once the commission develops the plan, it must hold a public 
hearing and provide notice of the hearing, generally by news-
paper announcement.103 After the hearing, the plan commission 
and the city council typically vote on whether to approve the 
project.104 
After a proposal is approved, the commission has substan-
tial authority over the area.105 While the extent to which emi-
nent domain powers may be used in an approved redevelop-
ment district varies by state, typically, once an area is 
designated as part of a redevelopment district, any use of emi-
nent domain in the area is considered a valid public use.106 
Furthermore, any objections to the designation not raised at 
the initial public hearing are considered waived.107 
Once the project is approved, the municipality implements 
the tax increment financing portion of the statute by issuing 
bonds to cover the costs of the project.108 These bonds are paid 
 
ing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15, 17–18 
(Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001). 
 101. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175. 
 102. See, e.g., id. subdiv. 3(b)(2)(i) (providing that the municipality shall 
find that “the proposed development or redevelopment would not reasonably 
be expected to occur solely through private investment within the reasonably 
foreseeable future”); see also Goshorn, supra note 99, at 927. 
 103. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175; see also Michel, supra note 99, 
at 460. 
 104. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175 (requiring municipal approval 
for a plan to proceed); see also Michel, supra note 99, at 460. 
 105. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.101 (West 2008) (setting forth the 
powers of an economic development authority). 
 106. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(c) (2006) (“An acquisition of 
property primarily for the purpose of the elimination of blight is rebuttably 
presumed to be for a public purpose and primarily for the benefit, use, or en-
joyment of the public under this subsection.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.101 
(providing for the creation of a redevelopment district); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 469.174, subdiv. 10 (West Interim Ann. Serv. June 2008) (setting forth the 
requirements for a redevelopment district); see also Michel, supra note 99, at 
462–63. 
 107. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(c) (“Any challenge to the exis-
tence of blighting factors alleged in a complaint to condemn under this subsec-
tion shall be raised within 6 months of the filing date of the complaint to con-
demn, and if not raised within that time the right to challenge the existence of 
those blighting factors shall be deemed waived.”). 
 108. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.1813–.1814 (West 2008); see also 
Goshorn, supra note 99, at 926–27. 
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off by any incremental growth in property-tax revenues from 
the redevelopment project area.109 This is accomplished by 
freezing the property tax assessments paid into the city trea-
sury during the period of the redevelopment project so that the 
city continues to receive the same revenue from the property 
taxes even as the value of the property rises.110 Since the prop-
erty owners pay taxes on the actual value of the property, any 
increase in property tax revenue can be used to pay off the 
debts incurred to finance the redevelopment.111 Once the bonds 
are paid off, the property-tax assessments can be unfrozen and 
the city receives the full balance of the tax revenues.112 The 
idea behind TIF is that the redevelopment project will cause a 
rise in the surrounding property values and that the city will 
use the additional tax revenue to pay off the bonds that it is-
sued to finance the redevelopment.113 Some have criticized this 
theory, suggesting that most increases in property values 
would have occurred even in the absence of the redevelop-
ment.114 
2. Challenging a Redevelopment Plan 
In this system, challenges to findings of public use and 
blight come in two contexts. First, after an administrative dec-
laration of blight but before condemnation of properties, a 
property owner seeking to challenge the public use of a particu-
lar redevelopment project may bring a reverse validation action 
within a set period of time.115 Otherwise, a challenge may come 
once a redevelopment agency brings condemnation proceedings 
against a property owner.116 Typically, in such a condemnation 
 
 109. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.177–.178 (West 2008); see also Go-
shorn, supra note 99, at 927–28; Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 996–97. 
 110. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.177; see also Goshorn, supra note 99, 
at 927–28; Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 996–97. 
 111. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.177; see also Goshorn, supra note 99, 
at 927–28; Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 996. 
 112. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.177; see also Goshorn, supra note 99, 
at 928. 
 113. See Goshorn, supra note 99, at 928–29; Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 997. 
 114. See Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 997. 
 115. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33501 (West 2008) (setting 
forth a cause of action for a reverse validation action challenging a redevelop-
ment plan and setting a ninety-day window for bringing the challenge); id. 
§ 33501.2 (providing that those issues not raised at the administrative level 
are waived for subsequent judicial proceedings); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 860 
(West 2008) (setting forth the procedural basis for challenging such an action). 
 116. See 6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.05[1] (3d ed. 2006). 
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the only way that a property owner may obtain injunctive relief 
is to show that the condemnation is not a public use within the 
meaning of the statute.117 In states that limit redevelopment to 
blighted areas, this showing frequently turns on whether the 
property is blighted or whether development would not happen 
but-for the intervention of the agency.118 In addition to or in-
stead of the public use challenge, the owner may also challenge 
the agency’s offer of payment as not the just compensation re-
quired by law.119 
II.  REDEVELOPMENT REFORM AND THE PROBLEM OF 
IMPLEMENTATION: AWARDING LITIGATION EXPENSES 
AS A MEANS OF EMPOWERING PROPERTY OWNERS TO 
CHALLENGE ILLEGAL CONDEMNATIONS   
Despite the paradigm shift in the treatment of public use 
and blight in state legislatures and courts and the increased in-
terest in providing procedural protections for property owners, 
statutes limiting the power of municipal redevelopment agen-
cies are difficult to apply in practice, leading to persistent un-
der-implementation.120 States have considered a variety of 
means to reinforce procedural and substantive protections, in-
cluding granting the state attorney general or other public fig-
ure the power to review redevelopment plans,121 entrusting the 
decision-making power for redevelopment districts to elected 
city councils rather than unelected redevelopment officers,122 or 
passing fee-shifting statutes to provide property owners full 
access to the courts.123 Part II of this Note analyzes the issues 
that states face in implementing additional protections for 
property owners and suggests that a simple fee-shifting statute 
 
 117. See id. (noting that the government entity seeking to take the proper-
ty must first show it has the “right to condemn” the property). 
 118. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810 (2000). 
 119. See 6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 116. 
 120. See generally LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, REDEVELOPMENT AF-
TER REFORM: A PRELIMINARY LOOK (1994), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ 
1994/redevelopment_after_reform.html. 
 121. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp. 2008). 
 122. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don: Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers, 32 J. LEGIS. 
165, 178 (2006) (“To promote transparency and political accountability, Con-
gress might require that local officials compile a record and set forth their jus-
tifications for concluding that a project will benefit the public as well as a pri-
vate developer. Perhaps it can also require that the politically-accountable 
officials make the decision.”). 
 123. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006). 
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is the most efficient mechanism for improving these statutes. 
This Part also discusses the theory behind fee-shifting statutes 
in the eminent domain context and evaluates the strengths and 
weaknesses of several such statutes already in place. 
A. BLIGHT, CONDEMNATION, AND THE PROBLEM OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Although states acted to limit the power of cities to engage 
in redevelopment for economic growth, these reforms are only 
as effective as the means of implementing them. Take the defi-
nition of blight. Notoriously difficult to define, blight provides 
an easy label to assign to communities that may or may not be 
in a serious state of disrepair.124 A redevelopment agency look-
ing for a successful project may be tempted to include more 
land in a redevelopment district than is strictly necessary since 
the agency will generally finance the project with tax revenue 
derived from the entire redevelopment district.125 This is equal-
ly true for the determinations of public use and but-for causa-
tion that also frequently figure prominently in agency decision-
making.126 Thus, while there are doubtless many instances of 
genuine blight and slums for which the use of eminent domain 
may be appropriate, there are many others in which specious 
blight designations are used by well-connected developers to 
obtain bargaining advantages in real estate negotiations.127 
 
 124. See Gordon, supra note 83, at 320–24. 
 125. See Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 1003–04 (“Despite formal legal require-
ments, there is usually only a weak connection between an area’s TIF poten-
tial and its blight. A redevelopment agency with a strong survival instinct 
needs to produce tax increments starting in the year after the redevelopment 
boundaries are set. . . . This usually precludes redevelopment of the most 
crime-ridden and poverty-stricken sites in town because there is simply no al-
ternate market for them.”). 
 126. See Gordon, supra note 83, at 323–25. 
 127. See, e.g., R.I. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 106 (R.I. 2006) 
(“It is apparent to us that changes . . . that RIAC could not achieve at the bar-
gaining table were obtained in Superior Court through an exercise of the 
state’s eminent domain authority.”); Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 994–95 (“As city 
renewal directors came to accept the fact that private developers had no capac-
ity to re-build in the worst parts of cities, they searched for ‘the blight that’s 
right’—places just bad enough to clear but good enough to attract developers. 
When program administrators couldn’t legitimately find blight in areas with 
good prospects for redevelopment, they fabricated it.”); Somin, supra note 35, 
at 264–71 (detailing a number of particularly troubling instances in which a 
blight rationale was used for redeveloping areas that would not meet any lay-
person’s definition of blight); Andrew Jacobs, Judge Stops Newark Redevelop-
ment Project, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2007, at B3 (describing a case in which the 
“close links” between the city administration and the developers raised serious 
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Furthermore, the procedural protections of due process are of 
little benefit to property owners unless they are enforced rigo-
rously and uniformly.128 
The recent proliferation of state supreme court decisions 
striking down redevelopment plans as illegal, often under new-
ly reformed state laws, suggests that courts are willing to en-
force stricter statutes.129 However, the large number of recent 
decisions also suggests that redevelopment agencies frequently 
do not police themselves with the rigor necessary to maintain 
the balance between redevelopment interests and property in-
terests that many state legislatures intended. For example, 
California limits the use of eminent domain to blighted areas, 
and California courts are frequently willing to interpret these 
statutes strictly against the redevelopment agencies.130 Howev-
er, even after a significant redevelopment reform effort in the 
1990s, the California Legislative Analyst’s Office reported that 
there was “no evidence that redevelopment project areas” were 
“smaller in size or more focused on eliminating urban blight 
than project areas adopted in earlier years.”131 It went on to 
suggest that, because of the “decentralized and weak” oversight 
system, the legislature could have “no assurance that commun-
ities will follow its intent regarding the [Community Redeve-
lopment Law]—or that questionable redevelopment activities 
will be reviewed and challenged.”132 Thus, even states engaged 
in a serious overhaul of their redevelopment statutes may have 
trouble changing the long-standing practices of redevelopment 
agencies and translating legislative reform into concrete pro-
tections and safeguards for property owners. 
Given the cost of challenging a redevelopment agency’s de-
cision to designate a particular property as blighted, it is likely 
that many valid challenges are never brought.133 This is partic-
 
questions about the misuse of redevelopment statutes). 
 128. See, e.g., Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 129–32 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (emphasizing the importance of notice in the eminent domain con-
text). 
 129. See, e.g., Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 
A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1142–43 
(Ohio 2006); R.I. Dev. Corp., 892 A.2d at 106. 
 130. Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 991. For a decision in which a California 
court struck down redevelopment proposals as not complying with state blight 
laws, see Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2000). 
 131. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 120. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Hearing, supra note 40, at 26 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) 
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ularly true in residential neighborhoods where the costs of 
bringing a suit may surpass the value of the homes them-
selves.134 Given that substantial research indicates that those 
property owners who are affected by blight designations and 
eminent domain tend to have less education and less wealth 
than the average American, this problem is particularly 
acute.135 This makes it difficult for large portions of the popula-
tion to obtain any legal remedy, thus undermining the efforts of 
state legislatures and courts to redress these important prob-
lems.136 
This problem is particularly pronounced for those property 
owners who want injunctive relief (i.e. no redevelopment) ra-
ther than additional compensation.137 Since many eminent do-
main attorneys work on a contingency fee basis, property own-
ers who want to keep their property rather than negotiate for a 
better offer may have additional difficulties finding an attorney 
to represent them.138 Although there are some public interest 
firms that do work in this area and some attorneys who are 
willing to volunteer their services pro bono, the demand for this 
type of work substantially outstrips the supply.139 
B. IMPROVING IMPLEMENTATION: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The problems that property owners face in opposing rede-
velopment projects have not gone unnoticed and several poten-
tially useful solutions have been proposed. For example, some 
 
(“Having represented property owners in condemnation lawsuits, I would say 
it is very difficult and expensive for the property owner . . . to defend the tak-
ing. . . . [T]o do a long-term, in-the-trenches battle with the city to contest the 
taking may cost $50,000 or $100,000 right out of their pocket, and most people 
don’t have it.”). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: 
HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 28–29 (1989) (discussing the disproportionate 
impact the urban renewal projects of the mid-twentieth century had on poor 
minority communities). 
 136. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 888–89 (discussing the 
increased likelihood that owners of low-value homes will be undercompensated 
because of their inability to afford adequate legal counsel). 
 137. See Hearing, supra note 40, at 21 (statement of Thomas W. Merrill, 
Professor, Columbia University School of Law). 
 138. Id. (“It is very important for the Congress to understand the way in 
which most property owners are able to obtain a lawyer in an eminent domain 
case. They hire someone on a contingent fee arrangement, and so it is critical 
for people to get legal representation that there be some money on the table 
out of which the contingency fee lawyer can be compensated.”). 
 139. See id. at 21–22. 
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suggest that state legislatures should give the state attorneys 
general the responsibility to review redevelopment plans and 
act as a check on overzealous redevelopment agencies.140 Utah 
implemented a version of this solution, creating the Office of 
the Property Rights Ombudsman in 1997.141 The purpose of 
this office is to aid in mediation of land disputes and to deter-
mine the fairness of redevelopment agencies’ actions.142 This 
solution has proven effective in reducing the amount of litiga-
tion over property rights disputes in Utah by applying the prin-
ciples of alternative dispute resolution to the eminent domain 
context.143 The agency also helps property owners opposing a 
redevelopment action by providing them with additional infor-
mation for free and a neutral arbitrator to serve as a check on 
agency overreaching.144 Ombudsman statutes certainly alle-
viate some of the problems associated with overreaching rede-
velopment agencies, and states looking to give additional pro-
tections to property owners should consider them.145 However, 
although they create an additional forum for resolving issues, 
they are not sufficient alone to ensure fair representation for 
the property owner and do little to enable the property owner to 
obtain independent legal counsel.146 Furthermore, although 
having a neutral arbitrator might resolve some disputes, it also 
creates a bureaucracy that may not be responsive to the unique 
needs of individual property owners. 
 
 140. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 120 (“Specifically, we 
recommend that the Legislature pass legislation requiring local governments 
to submit all proposed redevelopment plans, pass-through agreements, and 
five-year implementation plans to the state for a finding of consistency with 
the [Community Redevelopment Law]. . . . [W]e recommend that this respon-
sibility be assigned to the state Attorney General.”). 
 141. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp. 2008). It is worth 
noting, however, that the ombudsman in Utah is independent from the attor-
ney general and is separately funded. See CRAIG M. CALL, HOW UTAH RE-
SOLVES EMINENT DOMAIN DISPUTES 2 (2007), http://www.propertyrights 
.utah.gov/booklet_how-ut-resolves-emdom-disputes.pdf. 
 142. See Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman, Home Page, http:// 
propertyrights.utah.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (describing the nature of 
the ombudsman office). 
 143. See CALL, supra note 141, at 2. 
 144. Id. at 2, 6. 
 145. For a useful discussion of some of the advantages of ombudsman sta-
tutes, see Hannah Jacobs, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of 2006 Tak-
ings Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1560–62 (2007). 
 146. See CALL, supra note 141, at 6 (“The process is not meant to suggest 
that property owners must avoid lawyers. The OPRO allows full participation 
by counsel for either party.”). 
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Another possible approach would require that those who 
make the final decisions on redevelopment projects be elected 
representatives rather than unelected redevelopment offi-
cials.147 While this solution would increase political accounta-
bility, its effectiveness would necessarily be somewhat li-
mited.148 While elected officials who abused their authority 
could be voted out of office after the fact, this would not get 
someone’s home or business back if it had already been tak-
en.149 Furthermore, this would not necessarily create sufficient 
disincentives for officials in cases in which only a small number 
of property owners were affected, since they would be unlikely 
to have enough political clout to force anyone out of office.150 
Although both the aforementioned proposals have some 
merit, the most attractive approach to improving implementa-
tion of eminent domain statutes is a fee-shifting statute, which 
would allow property owners to obtain attorney’s fees and other 
litigation expenses in cases in which the homeowner is the pre-
vailing party. Over the last forty years, both state and federal 
governments have used fee-shifting statutes in many different 
contexts to enable private individuals to bring certain types of 
lawsuits that serve some larger public goal.151 This type of sta-
tute has already been enacted in a number of states in the emi-
 
 147. See Bell, supra note 122, at 178. 
 148. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 35, at 201–03 (discussing challenges asso-
ciated with relying on the political system to correct for these problems). 
 149. For an example of this type of situation, see Wameng Moua, New 
Eminent Domain Reform Brings Joy to Local Businessman, but Doesn’t Get 
His Land Back, HMONG TODAY, May 26, 2006, at 1, available at http://www 
.hmongtoday.com/displaynews.asp?ID=2254. 
 150. Justice Thomas addressed this issue in his dissenting opinion in Kelo 
v. City of New London, writing that 
these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those 
communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands 
to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically 
powerful. If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review 
of constitutional provisions that protect “discrete and insular minori-
ties” surely that principle would apply with great force to the power-
less groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects. 
545 U.S. 469, 521–22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
 151. See Michael Wietecki, Comment, True Access to the Courts for Citizens 
Working to Protect Natural Resources: Incorporating Attorney’s Fees into the 
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 
164–80 (2006) (discussing the use of fee-shifting to incentivize private actions 
enforcing environmental regulations); see generally Gregory C. Sisk, The Es-
sentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for 
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 220–26 
(1994) (discussing awards of attorneys’ fees under federal law). 
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nent domain context,152 and expanding this approach to other 
states would be both simple and effective. For states concerned 
about the balance of power between state agencies and individ-
uals in condemnation actions, a fee-shifting statute would help 
to even the odds by allowing private individuals to pursue me-
ritorious legal claims against redevelopment agencies aided by 
counsel. The remainder of this Note analyzes the advantages 
and disadvantages of this approach at length, with a focus on 
states in which fee shifting has been utilized. It concludes by 
synthesizing the best elements of a few different statutes to 
provide a potential model statute that optimizes the various re-
levant considerations and could be enacted by state legislatures 
concerned with this issue. 
C. THE THEORY BEHIND FEE SHIFTING IN THE EMINENT 
DOMAIN CONTEXT 
Under the American Rule, parties to litigation generally 
pay their own fees although state and federal legislatures have 
carved out numerous exceptions to this general policy.153 While 
a number of states have crafted exceptions to the American 
Rule in the eminent domain context,154 there is little scholarly 
discourse as to the theoretical justifications for such a move. 
Thus, before examining the current legal landscape in this 
area, it is worthwhile to examine why an application of fee-
shifting principles might be uniquely appropriate in the emi-
nent domain context. 
1. Comparison of Fee-Shifting in Eminent Domain and the 
Citizen Suit in Environmental Law 
There is a long tradition of “citizen suits” in the Anglo-
American tradition, whereby an individual citizen brings suit 
to enforce a larger government regulatory scheme and to ad-
 
 152. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 73.092 
(2005); IOWA CODE § 6B.33 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 213.66 (Lexis-
Nexis Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §§ 
701–702 (McKinney 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
28-2-510 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06). 
 153. See Sisk, supra note 151, at 223; see generally John F. Vargo, The 
American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Jus-
tice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1634–35 (1993) (discussing the policies underlying 
the american rule). 
 154. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122; FLA. STAT. § 73.092; IOWA 
CODE § 6B.33; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 213.66; MINN. STAT. § 117.031; N.Y. 
EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §§ 701–702; OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11; S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 28-2-510; WIS. STAT. § 32.28. 
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vance some public good.155 The idea of delegating at least some 
of the responsibility for enforcing regulatory schemes has been 
adopted by many in the environmental movement who argue 
that government agencies have been captured by lobbyists and 
special interests and have therefore failed in their administra-
tive duties.156 Here, fee shifting is seen as but one way of many 
of enabling concerned citizens and attorneys to bring suits to 
enforce legislative regulatory schemes that are being persis-
tently under enforced.157 
While statutes providing for fee shifting in the eminent 
domain context bear some resemblance to statutes dealing with 
citizen suits, they arise in a qualitatively different context. 
Most importantly, since property owners are typically the de-
fendants in eminent domain proceedings, there is no need for 
the private attorney general rationale. Those challenging find-
ings of blight or public use are not citizens concerned about a 
larger social or environmental problem, but are made involun-
tary parties in the redevelopment process. Even in cases where 
the property owners are plaintiffs, they are still typically on the 
defensive as their properties have usually been declared 
blighted and are under threat of condemnation.158 Thus, even 
when a property owner sues to challenge a finding of blight, his 
motivation for the suit is typically to raise the issue within the 
short statute of limitations after an administrative finding of 
blight so as to preserve the right to challenge the issue of public 
use later on rather than simply to act as a check on agency 
overreaching.159 Thus, while the regulatory-enhancement ra-
tionale of the citizen suit remains, it is coupled in the eminent 
domain action with very serious considerations of equity. 
 
 155. See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforce-
ment: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental 
Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 835 (1985). 
 156. See id. at 837–38. 
 157. See id. at 835 (listing various devices, such as punitive damages, im-
plied rights of action, and attorney’s fees provisions). 
 158. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33501(a) (West 1999) (allow-
ing property owners to challenge the validity of redevelopment plans); CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 860, 863 (West 2007). 
 159. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33501, 33501.2 (West Supp. 
2008) (providing a ninety-day window for challenging “the designation of the 
survey area” after which such objections shall be waived). 
 766 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:741 
 
2. Fee-Shifting Statutes and the Spirit of the Constitutional 
Mandate Requiring Just Compensation for Property Owners 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides 
that “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”160 Typically, just compensation is un-
derstood to be fair market value.161 However, in situations in 
which the redevelopment agency’s initial offer is substantially 
below market value or in which the taking of the property does 
not comply with state law, a property owner who wishes to op-
pose the action has little choice but to hire a lawyer and incur 
significant additional expenses.162 Thus, even if the property 
owner receives the fair market value for the property or obtains 
injunctive relief, he will not be made whole because he will still 
have to personally bear the costs of litigation.163 Furthermore, 
there is a significant possibility that the prohibitive costs of lit-
igation may make a condemnee forgo an otherwise meritorious 
claim and accept less than fair market value.164 
This is not to suggest that the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution mandates that attorney’s fees be paid by the gov-
ernment for parties opposing eminent domain actions,165 but it 
does support an argument that fee-shifting provisions flow from 
the spirit of the Fifth Amendment.166 The idea of fee shifting in 
 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 161. For a discussion of some of the limitations of such a “market value” 
calculation, see EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 182–83 (“Yet market price still con-
tains a systematic bias that underestimates the use value, which is typically 
in excess of its exchange value.”). 
 162. N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, 1987 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
LAW REVISION COMMISSION, reprinted in N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 
(Consol. 2008). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. For the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of this argument, 
see Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 (1930) (holding that attorney’s fees 
are not part of the “just compensation” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment). 
For a more recent Ninth Circuit decision following this opinion, see United 
States v. 4.18 Acres of Land, 542 F.2d 786, 788 (1976). 
 166. An interesting turn-of-the-century case does suggest that litigation 
expenses be included in a computation of “just compensation”: 
The Constitution requires that private property shall not be taken for 
public purposes except upon the payment of “just compensation”; and 
a man who is forced into court, where he owes no obligation to the 
party moving against him, cannot be said to have received “just com-
pensation” for his property if he is put to an expense appreciably im-
portant to establish the value of his property. 
In re Water Supply in N.Y., 109 N.Y.S. 652, 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908), aff ’d, 
85 N.E. 1117 (N.Y. 1908). 
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condemnation actions has a long-standing pedigree and found 
some champions as early as the nineteenth century.167 While 
fee shifting in eminent domain actions may not be required by 
the Constitution, there is certain equity in treating the proper-
ty owners’ lawyers as a cost of redevelopment, similar to the 
way in which the redevelopment agency’s lawyers are 
treated.168 The New York Law Revision Commission adopted 
this logic in its 1987 proposals for reform.169 In its proposals, 
the Commission recommended that the New York legislature 
adopt a statute that would allow judges to award costs and liti-
gation expenses to property owners opposing condemnation ac-
tions in some circumstances.170 The New York legislature im-
plemented these recommendations that same year to loosen 
some of the restrictions on attorneys’-fees awards.171 Since 
then, this legislation has enabled judges to award attorney’s 
fees to property owners for meritorious claims in numerous in-
stances, providing meaningful benefits to New York property 
owners facing the threat of condemnation.172 
 
 167. One court wrote that 
[a] person or corporation whose property is sought to be taken under 
condemnation proceedings is entitled to be heard at every step in the 
process, and in justice should be compensated, not only for the land or 
property taken, but should be indemnified against all costs and ex-
penses reasonably incurred either in resisting the appropriation or in 
the proceedings for ascertaining the compensation to be made. 
City of Brooklyn v. Long Island Water-Supply Co., 42 N.E. 413, 413 (N.Y. 
1895). 
 168. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 888–90 (discussing fee 
shifting as one attempt by state legislatures to even the balance of power be-
tween property owners and the government). 
 169. N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 162. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2003) (as amended in 
1987). 
 172. See, e.g., Gelsomino v. City of New Rochelle, 809 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding that the trial court appropriately awarded the 
property owners attorneys’ fees where the condemnor’s original offer was 
$310,000 and the court awarded $420,000); In re Williamsburgh II Urban Re-
newal Area, 616 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (affirming the deci-
sion of the lower court to award attorney’s fees when the claimant was 
awarded $152,000 rather than the $52,000 offered by the condemnor); Malin v. 
State, 584 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that the claimant 
was entitled to attorney’s fees after the trial court found her property was 
worth $475,000 rather than the $265,400 that she was initially offered by the 
State). 
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3. Using Fee-Shifting Statutes to Incentivize Meritorious 
Causes of Action and to Deter Agency Abuse 
One of the most common criticisms of fee-shifting provi-
sions, particularly one-way fee-shifting provisions, is that they 
incentivize frivolous litigation.173 Although this is certainly a 
very reasonable concern in general, it is of much less concern in 
the eminent domain context because the parties challenging a 
determination of blight or public use are involuntary partici-
pants in many senses. They do not seek out the litigation, but 
merely are resisting municipal actions that threaten to take 
away their property. 
Furthermore, state legislatures may largely eliminate the 
danger of incentivizing frivolous lawsuits by conditioning the 
recovery of litigation expenses and other costs on prevailing in 
the lawsuit.174 Lawyers representing parties who could not oth-
erwise pay would carefully weigh the merits of the lawsuit and 
the likelihood of success before taking the case.175 Furthermore, 
the rules of civil procedure are designed to penalize lawyers 
and litigants who bring frivolous lawsuits, providing a further 
disincentive to engage in this practice.176 Thus, while property 
owners might occasionally raise frivolous claims regarding just 
compensation or public use, it is unlikely that the fee-shifting 
statute would be responsible for encouraging such claims.177 
Along with enabling property owners to bring meritorious 
claims, these statutes serve the secondary function of deterring 
redevelopment agencies from taking actions of questionable le-
gality.178 The knowledge that well-represented property owners 
would almost certainly challenge such actions in court would 
likely make agencies more cautious about declaring large sec-
tions of a city blighted and more willing to make comprehensive 
 
 173. But see Boyer & Meidinger, supra 155, at 934 (noting that fee-shifting 
statutes in the environmental context do not seem to have incentivized frivol-
ous law suits). 
 174. Cf. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney’s Fees Against the 
Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 742–44 (1993) (discussing the is-
sues that can go into defining a “prevailing party”). 
 175. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 155, at 934 (stating that fee shift-
ing in the environmental context has not seemed to produce frivolous law-
suits). 
 176. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (authorizing sanctions in response to fri-
volous suits brought in federal court). 
 177. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 155, at 934. 
 178. See Sisk, supra note 151, at 220. 
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findings of fact available to the public prior to the condemna-
tion to insulate the taking from challenge. 
These statutes, where enacted, have had a real impact of 
significantly improving property owners’ access to attorneys. 
For example, in Florida, one of the states that has enacted the 
toughest fee-shifting laws,179 a group of law firms are devoted 
to providing representation to property owners in eminent do-
main actions without charging them fees.180 Even in those 
states with less strict fee-shifting provisions, there are a signif-
icant number of law firms that advertise the accessibility of 
their services to all property owners.181 
4. Enhancing Principles of Federalism While Promoting a 
Client-Centered Approach 
In addition to enabling property owners to bring merito-
rious claims while deterring abuse of municipal authority, fee-
shifting statutes operate well within the context of federal-
ism.182 These statutes, passed by state legislatures, enhance 
the substantive procedural protections that the state already 
has in place. This approach has the advantage of squarely ad-
dressing the federalism concerns raised by the National League 
of Cities in their amicus brief supporting the city in Kelo.183 In 
 
 179. See FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (2005). 
 180. See, e.g., Fixel, Maguire & Willis, Responsibility for Fees, http://www 
.fla-eminentdomain.com/fees.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008); Florida Property 
Rights Law Firm, P.A., http://www.florida-eminent-domain.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2008).The Law Firm of Savlov and Anderson, P.A., Economics of Emi-
nent Domain, http://www.flaeminentdomain.com/practiceareas/economics-of-
eminent-domain.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
 181. See, e.g., Archer & Greiner, P.C., Condemnation and Eminent Domain 
Law, http://www.archerlaw.com/ (follow “Practices” hyperlink; then “Litigation 
Services”; then “Condemnation and Eminent Domain Law”) (last visited Nov. 
3, 2008) (New Jersey firm offering eminent-domain services on a contingency 
basis and advertising recovery of attorney’s fees); Niebler & Roth, LLP, Con-
demnation/Eminent Domain Law, http://www.nieblerroth.com/practiceareas/ 
eminent-domain-law.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (Wisconsin firm offering 
eminent-domain services and advertising fact that Wisconsin law allows re-
covery of attorney’s fees). 
 182. Cf. Hearing, supra note 40, at 16 (statement of Thomas W. Merrill, 
Professor, Columbia University School of Law) (expressing a preference for 
allowing states to determine their own level of substantive protections rather 
than setting a uniform national standard); Klass, supra note 19, at 690–94 
(discussing the advantages of reform on the state level in the context of emi-
nent domain). 
 183. See Brief for the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 12–16, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166931. 
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their brief, they argue that eminent domain is essentially a lo-
cal concern, and the needs and preferences of the communities 
of Utah may be quite distinct from those of the communities of 
Connecticut.184 By passing fee-shifting statutes that require the 
redevelopment agencies to pay the property owner’s attorney’s 
fees, state legislatures will have the opportunity to reinforce ex-
isting procedures and protections.185 Thus, this type of statute 
naturally reinforces the principle of federalism by allowing 
states to set and reinforce differing levels of protection. 
While promoting a local approach to the problem of emi-
nent domain reform, fee-shifting statutes also shift more power 
to the individual whose property is in danger of being taken, al-
lowing him, with the advice of his lawyer, to determine the best 
course to pursue.186 For some property owners, this may be ad-
ditional compensation and relocation expenses; for others, it 
may be injunctive relief.187 By giving the property owner the 
tools he needs to negotiate with the redevelopment agency on 
an even ground, the statutes serve to empower individuals in 
what otherwise might be perceived as a very disempowering 
situation.188 
D. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO STATUTES AWARDING 
LITIGATION EXPENSES 
The majority of states do not provide for attorney’s fees for 
property owners challenging public use or blight designations 
in condemnation actions, but a substantial minority of states189 
 
 184. Id. at 12–13. 
 185. See id. at 13 (highlighting the right of states to set higher levels of 
protections than the federal baseline). 
 186. This is true both for pre condemnation negotiations as well as for ac-
tual court proceedings. See generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Po-
litical Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 126 (2006) (“Most 
academic discussions of the undercompensation problem overlook another im-
portant fact: the compensation that a property owner receives almost always 
results from a bargain between the owner and a Taker, rather than a judicial 
determination of the property's fair market value.”). 
 187. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 890 (discussing fee-
shifting statutes as one way state legislatures have tried to restore the balance 
between the property owners and the government). 
 188. For a vivid example of the significant difference having an attorney 
can make to negotiations over “just compensation,” see Gaylord Merlin Ludo-
vici Diaz & Bain, Notable Cases, http://www.gaylordmerlin.com/notable_cases 
.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (highlighting differences between initial offers 
for property and the final price reached with the aid of representation). 
 189. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 890 (citing Garnett, supra 
note 186, at 129 & n.175) (estimating that twenty states have provisions that 
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have laws that do just this.190 A careful survey of the landscape 
of current fee-shifting statutes is useful, both for understanding 
the diversity of approaches within this area of law and for un-
derstanding the shortcomings and strengths of these approach-
es. 
There are four main categories of statutes that shift some 
or all of the property owner’s litigation expenses in the eminent 
domain context: unconditional fee shifting, conditional fee shift-
ing, limited reimbursements, and judicial discretion.191 Uncon-
ditional fee shifting likely allows fee shifting in favor of proper-
ty owners regardless of the outcome of litigation,192 while 
conditional fee shifting generally conditions the property own-
er’s award of litigation expenses on being a prevailing party to 
the litigation.193 Limited-reimbursement statutes allow for 
awards of litigation expenses up to a certain dollar amount,194 
and judicial discretion statutes generally leave the decision of 
whether or not to award attorney’s fees to the trial judge’s dis-
cretion in each particular case.195 It is helpful to examine an 
example of each type in turn to understand the types of protec-
tions available. 
1. Unconditional Fee Shifting 
Florida has some of the strongest protections for property 
owners in the country,196 and Florida law provides that attor-
ney’s fees are recoverable unconditionally.197 In determining 
awards of litigation expenses in Florida, courts look both to 
Florida statutes and to the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of 
“full compensation,”198 which together have generally been in-
 
provide for fee shifting in some cases in the eminent domain context). 
 190. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 73.092 
(2005); IOWA CODE § 6B.33 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 213.66 (Lexis-
Nexis Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §§ 
701–02 (McKinney 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
28-2-510 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06). 
 191. See N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 162, pt. IV. 
 192. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 73.092. 
 193. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (authorizing award of attorney’s fees 
when the difference between the amount offered and the amount awarded ex-
ceeds twenty percent or when the court determines that the taking is not for 
public use). 
 194. See, e.g., 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (West Supp. 2008). 
 195. See, e.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701. 
 196. See CASTLE COALITION, supra note 18, at 13. 
 197. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091–.131. 
 198. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091–.131. 
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terpreted to include attorney’s fees.199 One Florida court de-
scribed the purpose of this law as “to permit the owner to con-
test the value placed on his property by the condemning au-
thority and at the same time come out whole.”200 This idea is 
even more clearly set forth in City of Miami Beach v. Liflans 
Corp.,201 in which the court required the condemner pay the 
property owner’s attorney’s fees despite the fact that a jury 
awarded no compensation.202 The idea is premised on the con-
cept that when a property owner’s home or business is con-
demned, he becomes an involuntary participant in litigation 
and should have the right to have his attorney’s fees paid, even 
if his claim fails.203 
This line of reasoning is compelling, particularly when the 
property owner is an involuntary defendant and chooses to 
challenge a very close legal issue.204 However, the statute may 
be too broad in some circumstances, particularly if the property 
owner’s claim is frivolous and is dismissed without awarding 
additional compensation or any other form of relief.205 Fur-
thermore, the statute does not apply to property owners who 
are bringing suit themselves to challenge an overbroad blight 
designation or but-for agency determinations, both fixtures of 
the modern redevelopment landscape.206 A simpler statute that 
 
 199. See Ga. S. & Fla. R.R. Co. v. Duval Connecting R.R. Co., 187 So. 2d 
405, 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (“Thus it is seen that the public policy of 
this state as evidenced by the cited constitutional and statutory provisions has 
been to secure to a landowner full compensation—not full compensation less 
the expenses of his lawyer.”). 
 200. Hodges v. Div. of Admin., 323 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975), superseded by statute, 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-148, § 2, as recognized in 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Jack’s Quick Cash, Inc., 748 So. 2d 1049, 1053 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1999). 
 201. 259 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
 202. Id. at 516. 
 203. The Florida Supreme Court put the point as follows: 
Since the owner of private property sought to be condemned is forced 
into court by one to whom he owes no obligation, it cannot be said 
that he has received “just compensation” for his property if he is com-
pelled to pay out of his own pocket the expenses of establishing the 
fair value of the property, which expenses in some cases could con-
ceivably exceed such value. 
Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604–05 (Fla. 1950). 
 204. See Hodges, 323 So. 2d at 277 (finding that an award of attorney’s fees 
was appropriate when the issue challenged was close, even though the proper-
ty owner ultimately lost). 
 205. For a version of this critique, see N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, 
supra note 162, pts. IV, V. 
 206. See Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Gibbins, 696 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
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combines the conditional-fee-shifting model for successful suits 
and the judicial discretion model in limited cases may better 
achieve the right balance along with fairly predictable results. 
2. Conditional Fee Shifting 
Under Minnesota law,207 attorney’s fees are recoverable 
conditional on the property owner receiving an award of com-
pensation greater than what the condemning authority offered 
or upon a court determination that the taking is unlawful.208 
The Minnesota law is intriguing because it combines elements 
of the conditional recovery and the judicial discretion models. A 
court must make an award of litigation expenses to a property 
owner receiving an award of more than forty percent of the 
condemner’s initial offer or if the taking is proven to be not for 
public use or illegal.209 On the other hand, the court may award 
litigation expenses to a property owner recovering between 
twenty and forty percent more than the initial offer.210 Other 
states, including Wisconsin211 and Oklahoma,212 have enacted 
similar laws. 
This is a sophisticated approach and accomplishes several 
useful objectives. Most importantly, it ensures that property 
owners will be reimbursed for the worst instances of eminent 
domain abuse, while avoiding the possibility of over-
incentivizing litigation. However, by setting the bar for manda-
tory recovery at forty percent more than the initial offer,213 the 
Minnesota statute may discourage attorneys from bringing sol-
id cases that are likely to fall within the discretionary range. 
Furthermore, the Minnesota statute might be improved by al-
lowing more judicial discretion in awarding fees in determina-
tions of public use in which the claim is a close one but the 
property owner ultimately loses. Despite these limitations, 
Minnesota’s law remains one of the strongest and provides a 
 
App. 1997) (reversing an award of attorneys’ fees because, although there was 
an administrative proceeding by the Department of Environmental Protection 
seeking access to the plaintiff ’s property, there was no actual eminent domain 
proceeding within the meaning of the statute). 
 207. MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006). 
 208. See id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06). 
 212. OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001). 
 213. MINN. STAT. § 117.031. 
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partial framework for the proposed statute in Part III of this 
Note. 
3. Limited Reimbursement 
Pennsylvania takes the limited-reimbursement route to 
awarding attorney’s fees for opposing a condemnation action.214 
Under the Pennsylvania statute, the attorney’s-fee award 
available to a property owner’s lawyer is capped at four thou-
sand dollars, with some exceptions.215 Although this type of sta-
tute provides some compensation to the individual property 
owner opposing a government action and is relatively simple to 
administer, the amount of compensation will almost certainly 
be less than the actual cost in attorney’s fees and will under-
compensate the property owner.216 Thus, while this statute was 
intended to “materially assist the owner of a property inter-
est,”217 the notably low cap on awards renders the statute rela-
tively ineffective in balancing the power between the redeve-
lopment agency and property owner, making it the least 
satisfactory of the four categories.218 
4. Judicial Discretion 
Under New York law, attorney’s fees are recoverable at the 
discretion of the trial judge.219 The statute gives substantial de-
ference to the trial judge, stating that “where an order or award 
is substantially in excess of the amount of the condemnor’s 
proof” the court “may in its discretion” award the condemnee 
“an additional amount.”220 While it is true that the trial judge 
has a unique perspective on the litigation and can make 
nuanced judgments that legislatures cannot make in advance, 
by vesting almost unlimited discretion in the trial judge, the 
statute provides uncertain protections for property owners and 
invites unequal administration of the law.221 While an ap-
 
 214. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (West Supp. 2008). 
 215. Id. §§ 306(g), 308(d), 709. 
 216. See N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 162, pt. IV. 
 217. JOINT STATE GOV’T COMM., COMMENT (1971), reprinted in 26 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (West Supp. 2008). 
 218. See N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 162, at pt. IV. 
 219. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2003). 
 220. Id. 
 221. A look at some of the appellate decisions in which a state court of ap-
peals had to overturn a trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees supports this gen-
eral concern. See, e.g., County of Oswego v. Maroney, 588 N.Y.S.2d 478, 478 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that the trial court erred in denying attorney’s 
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proach emphasizing judicial discretion is useful in close cases, 
mandatory awards are more appropriate in cases where the 
property owner clearly qualifies as a prevailing party because 
they promote the enforcement of eminent domain statutes by 
increasing the willingness of attorneys to take on difficult cas-
es. 
III.  A MODEL STATUTE TO BE ENACTED BY STATE 
LEGISLATURES   
In light of this analysis, the following statute combines the 
best elements of the existing state statutes by adopting a bright 
line rule for fee shifting in most situations, including all those 
involving determinations of just compensation, while allowing 
for some judicial discretion in proceedings involving close ques-
tions of public use. It adopts the general elements of the condi-
tional-fee-shifting statute by providing for mandatory awards 
in certain circumstances in which the property owner has clear-
ly prevailed. By requiring a property owner to recover at least 
twenty percent more than the condemnor’s initial offer, it 
avoids encouraging property owners to bring claims that are 
not worth litigating while still setting the bar low enough not to 
discourage property owners from bringing legitimate griev-
ances to court. 
In addition to enabling property owners to bring merito-
rious claims for just compensation, this statute allows for full 
recovery of litigation expenses, including expenses related to 
administrative proceedings, where property owners can show 
the condemnation is not for a public use within the meaning of 
state law. Furthermore, in light of the importance of determi-
nations of public use in the eminent domain statutory scheme 
in most states, this statute also allows for awards of litigation 
expenses at a trial judge’s discretion in cases of public use. This 
is not intended to encourage litigation, but to enable property 
owners to contest close issues of public use by allowing a judge 
to award litigation expenses if he finds that the claims were 
substantially justified and that an award of litigation expenses 
is necessary for just and adequate compensation in that partic-
ular case. This decision is left to the discretion of the trial judge 
 
fees when the court’s award was more than two-hundred percent of the con-
demnor’s original offer); Scuderi v. State, 585 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1992) (finding the trial court erred when it determined that a court award 
41.4% in excess of the condemnor’s initial offer was not “substantially in 
excess”). 
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because he is in the best position to make the type of nuanced 
and concrete judgments necessary to a fair determination of 
this issue. 
Model Fee-Shifting Statute 
(1) In this section, “litigation expenses” means the sum of the costs, 
disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney, apprais-
al and engineering fees necessary to prepare for or participate in ac-
tual or anticipated proceedings before the condemnation commission-
ers, board of assessment or any other court.222 These expenses shall 
include, but not be limited to, those expenses necessary to prepare for 
and represent the property owner at the administrative level. 
(2) Litigation expenses shall be awarded to the condemnee or challen-
ger if:223 
(a) the final judgment or award for damages, as determined at 
any level of the eminent domain process, is more than 20 percent 
greater than the last written offer of compensation made by the 
condemning authority;224 
(b) the proceeding is abandoned by the condemnor after the pub-
lic use determination;225 or 
(c) the court or any other reviewing body determines that the 
condemnor does not have the right to condemn part or all of the 
property described in the jurisdictional offer or there is no neces-
sity for its taking.226 
(3) Litigation expenses for the determination of public use may be 
awarded to the condemnee or challenger if the trial judge deems it 
necessary for just and adequate compensation of the condemnee or 
challenger. 
This statute combines some of the best elements of the fee-
shifting statutes. It creates a bright-line standard for when liti-
gation expenses are recoverable in determinations of just com-
pensation and combines both the conditional recovery model 
and the judicial discretion model with regards to public use de-
terminations, providing for mandatory recovery if the property 
owner wins the public use issue and providing for recovery at 
the sole discretion of the judge if the property owner loses a 
close public use issue. 
This statute is not intended to conclusively answer all chal-
lenges in implementing substantive and procedural protections 
for property owners, nor is it intended to develop a revolutio-
nary approach to fee shifting in the eminent domain context. It 
is largely based on conditional fee-shifting statutes that have 
 
 222. Cf. WIS. STAT. § 32.28 (2005–06). 
 223. Cf. id. 
 224. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2006). 
 225. Cf. WIS. STAT. § 32.28. 
 226. Cf. id.  
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been successfully enacted in Minnesota and Wisconsin, but im-
proves on them in several important ways. 
First, this statute takes a unique approach to fee shifting 
in the context of determinations of public use. Under both Min-
nesota227 and Wisconsin228 law, property owners who lose on 
the issue of public use have no right to litigation expenses. This 
statute takes a significantly more flexible approach. Like the 
Minnesota and Wisconsin229 statutes, it guarantees that litiga-
tion expenses will be granted to the property owner who pre-
vails on the issue of public use. However, it also provides that 
litigation expenses may be granted at the trial judge’s discre-
tion in situations where the property owner loses on the issue 
of public use but the judge determines that the challenge was 
reasonable and brought in good faith. This modification is made 
in light of the importance that the American public clearly 
places on fair determinations of public use in the wake of Ke-
lo230 and on the importance of encouraging people to bring such 
challenges when there is a significant possibility that the rede-
velopment agency is abusing its authority and condemning 
property it has no right to condemn. 
Regarding the issue of just compensation, this statute 
adopts a purely conditional recovery approach, allowing recov-
ery where the court awards more than twenty percent of the 
condemning authority’s last written offer. In so doing, it sets 
the mandatory bar for recovery lower than Minnesota231 and 
higher than in Oklahoma.232 The decision to set the standard at 
twenty percent is based on an understanding that, while it is 
important to encourage individuals to challenge low appraisals 
of their property, a recovery of only ten or fifteen percent more 
than was originally offered is typically not worth the litigation. 
Thus, this statute represents a compromise position, setting 
the bar low enough to enable property owners to demand fair 
compensation, but high enough to prevent wasteful litigation. 
 
 227. MINN. STAT. § 117.031. 
 228. WIS. STAT. § 32.28. 
 229. See MINN. STAT. § 117.031; WIS. STAT. § 32.28. 
 230. It seems safe to say much of the controversy surrounding Kelo deals 
with what does and does not constitute a “public use” within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 
(2005) (“The question presented is whether the city's proposed disposition of 
this property qualifies as a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”). 
 231. See MINN. STAT. § 117.031. 
 232. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11 (2001). 
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Simple to enact, this statute could be passed by any state 
legislature looking to improve implementation of preexisting 
protections for property owners. While it is primarily intended 
as a straightforward starting point for state legislatures that 
are in the process of reforming their eminent domain codes and 
are concerned about the effective implementation of these new 
laws, it can also serve as a model for those states looking to op-
timize these laws in light of the recent developments in emi-
nent domain law. 
  CONCLUSION   
The enactment of fee-shifting statutes will not provide a 
conclusive answer to the problems of eminent domain abuse. 
The protections these statutes afford will be only as strong as 
the substantive protections of the states and the willingness of 
the courts to enforce these protections. However, fee-shifting 
provisions provide promising means of creating a mechanism 
that will both enable property owners to bring meritorious suits 
they might otherwise not be able to afford and to provide mea-
ningful deterrence to overzealous redevelopment agencies 
which might otherwise be tempted to overreach their legislative 
authority by offering less than just compensation or by relying 
on specious blight designations to promote goals of private eco-
nomic development. The utility of these statutes is necessarily 
limited since they can only reinforce pre-existing legal protec-
tions. Thus, the enactment of attorney’s-fees provisions by state 
governments should not be seen as the end of the debate, but 
rather as a useful procedural mechanism to reinforce existing 
state laws in a changing world. 
